Introduction
Benoit (1973, 1978) who found a positive effect of defense expenditure on economic growth, was initiating the investigation of the defense-growth relationship. After that, the relationship between defense expenditure and economic growth has been frequently explored analytically in the defense economics literature by Smith (1980) , Frederiksen and Looney (1982) , Deger and Smith (1983) , Lim (1983) , Biswas and Ram (1986) , Deger (1986) , Grobar and Porter, (1989) , Chen (1993) , Kollias (1994) , Chletsos and Kollias (1995) , Lipow and Antinori (1995) , DeRouen, (1995) , Landau (1996) , Sezgin (1996) , Murdoch, Pi and Sandler (1997) , Antonakis (1997) , Masih et al (1997) , DeRouen and Heo (2001) , (Rufael 2001) , Gerace (2002) , Atesoglu (2002) , Galvin (2003) , Mehanna (2004) , Karagol and Palaz (2004) , Klein (2004) , Kollias et al (2004) , Dunne et al (2005) , Heo and Eger (2005) , Lai et al (2005) , Reitschuler and Loening (2005) .
In the literature, there is much controversy over whether this defense expenditure is associated with higher or lower growth rates (Chang et al., 2001) ; First group argue that the net effect of defense expenditure on economic growth is positive (Benoit, 1973) . Second group argue that some combination of reduced savings and investment will ultimately lead to reduced growth (Deger, 1986; Grobar and Porter, 1989; Lipow and Antinori, 1995) . Third group tends to give The authors are grateful to anonymous referees and to the Editor of the Journal for constructive comments and suggestions. Any errors, however, are the fault of the authors.
context-specific explanations that vary from positive to negative effects (Frederiksen and Looney, 1982; DeRouen, 1995; Landau, 1996) .
Although military expenditure may affect growth through several channels such as the Keynesian-type aggregate demand effect, Joerding (1986) states that economic growth may be causally previous to defense expenditures. For instance, a country with high growth rates may wish to strengthen itself against foreign or domestic threats by increased defense spending. The important thing is to assess whether defence spending initiates economic growth or, conversely, is affected by changes in the economy. Heo (1996 and 1999) has used two approaches to investigate relationship between defense expenditure and economic growth. In the first approach, he used one link for this relationship called direct effect. In the second approach, he investigated the effects of defense expenditure on growth via investment or export. These effects are called indirect effects (see Figure 1 ).
"take in Figure 1"
In this study we focus on direct effects of defense expenditure on growth for Turkey and Greece. Furthermore we investigate the direction of causality between the growth of GNP and defense expenditures. In our future research, we will investigate the indirect effects of defense expenditure on growth via investment or exports.
Conflicts between Turkey and Greece
The trouble between Greece and Turkey is not recent but is rather a continuation of older enmities that have resurfaced after the Cold War. Both countries have a history of invading the other. Turkey's predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, ruled Greece until the first half of the 19 th century when the bloody Greek War of Independence led to the creation of the Greek state. After World War I, Greece invaded the remnants of the Ottoman Empire hoping to annex Anatolia (now rroaa 3 Turkey) and began a war which led to the defeat of Greece and the creation of modern Turkey.
Echoes of these conflicts still roil the waters in Greek-Turkish relations (Cadena, 1998) . 1964, 1967, 1976 and 1996 over Cyprus and the continental shelf, airspace and small islets in the Aegean (Rumelili, 2003) .
In July 1974, an attempted coup d'état lasting eight days was mounted against the government of Archbishop Makarios, then president of Cyprus, by a group of extremist Greek Cypriots. Turkey responded by intervening militarily, using its rights as a guarantor of the republic, and Turkish armed forces have maintained troops on the northern part of the island ever since. In 1976, two years after the coup attempt and the subsequent Turkish intervention, the Turkish-controlled north was named the Turkish Cypriot Federal State. This was followed by the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. Until now, Turkey has been the only country that has recognized the breakaway state, and it has concluded a number of agreements with the country. The Greek part of the island is recognized as the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in the international arena and continues to act in the name of the entire island. Since 1974, several attempts at mediation by the UN and the USA to achieve a reunified state on the island have failed (Guney, 2004; Fisher, 2001, Eralp and Beriker, 2005) .
If Greece were to extend its territorial waters from the current six nautical miles to the twelve-mile limit permitted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Turkey has repeatedly stated that it would consider such an act a casus belli. (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, 2003) Furthermore, In January 1996 the simmering conflict nearly exploded into war over the uninhabited Imia/Kardak islets of Turkey. These small Turkish islets, which are claimed by both rroaa countries, became a catalyst for crisis when Greek and Turkish nationalists engaged in a highly publicized competition to enforce sovereignty over Kardak. Both nations adamantly defended their positions in the dispute and threatened the use of force. Only intense diplomatic pressure from the United States averted an armed encounter between the two NATO allies.
In addition, the January 1997 purchase of a Russian S-300 air defense system by RoC has heightened tensions in the region. Turkey has vowed not to allow deployment of the system on the island, but RoC has committed it self to purchasing the system and receiving it by 1998. The S-300 purchase has created a deadline after which a conflict could occur because of the aggressive and unyielding stance of both parties. Additionally, the governments in both Greece and Turkey are not as receptive to peace initiatives as in they have been in the past; in Turkey's case because of the need to protect nationalist principles in the face of an internal Islamist challenge to the nationalistsecular order and in Greece because of the loss of face the government suffered after the Kardak crisis. Turkey's coalition government is faced with internal turmoil which further decreases the possibility of an accord and increases the likelihood of an escalation. Such a government cannot hope to remain in power by compromising on what are popularly perceived to be vital interests such as sovereignty over Kardak and must therefore adopt rigid nationalistic positions. These factors have given the crisis between Greece and Turkey an urgency which it did not possess earlier in the decade (Cadena, 1998) .
Empirical results

Data
The empirical analysis employs annual data on GDP and defense expenditure for Turkey "take in Table I" "take in Table II " Table I reports the results of non-stationary test for tds, ty, gds, gy using ADF tests. We 
Cointegration test
Having established that defense expenditures and incomes are I(1), we test for cointegration between ds and y, using the residual-based test of Engle and Granger (E-G; 1987) .
The null hypothesis of the E-G cointegration test is that the two variables I(1) are not cointegrated. If the variables are not cointegrated, then the OLS residuals are not stationary. Therefore, the cointegration test is the test of a unit root of the residual series 3 .
"take in Table III " The hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in triad case, tds, gds and ty. These results
show that long-run equilibrium exist among these variables. However, in the last model of triad case, gds, tds and gy, the hypothesis of no cointegration is not rejected. This results indicate no long-run equilibrium exist among these variables.
Causality test
The Granger Test for causality is such a technique searching the direction of causality between variables. As Granger (1988) Masih et al (1997) , Chen (1993. economic growth to military expenditures or vice versa; bidirectional causality between the two variables; and, finally, lack of any causal relationship. Table IV reports the causality test result for both Turkey and Greece. Lag lenght is selected by using the AIC criterion. The probability values for F statistics are given on the right side of Table IV . If these probability values are less than any α level, then the hypothesis would be rejected at that level. We found unidirectional causality running from economic growth to defense expenditure for Turkey. On the other hand, we found no causality between other variables "take in Table IV "
Conclusion
In this study, we examined the relationship between defense expenditure and economic growth for Turkey and Greece. For analysis, we used to yearly data in the period of 1956-2003.
According to EG cointegration test results, we found that long-run equilibrium exist between defense expenditure and income for Turkey and Greece and, also, a long-run equilibrium between Turkey's defense expenditure and Greece's defense expenditure. The hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in triad case, tds, gds and ty. These results show that long-run equilibrium exists among these variables. However, second triad case, gds, tds and gy, the hypothesis of no cointegration is not rejected. This results indicate no long-run equilibrium exist among these variables. The causality test results show that there is an unidirectional causality running from economic growth to defense expenditure only for Turkey. 
Figure1: Indirect Link between Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth
